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1.  Overview of M. Koszowy’s essay and treatment of the topic   
 
Working generally within a framework of argumentation theory and the tradition of informal 
logic, Marcin Koszowy argues that the concept of logical error is more inclusive than the 
concept of logical fallacy and, therefore, that it better serves evaluating human mistakes.  His 
essay has five sections: an introduction; a section each on the two concepts; a defense of their 
distinction; and some concluding remarks.  Below we first review the salient points of this essay 
and we then provide some comments whose aim is to caution against psychologism. 
Koszowy begins with the thematic question of his essay: “Does the concept of logical fallacy 
capture all cases of human ‘illogical moves?’” (emphasis added).  The ‘all’ here is not 
extraneous to his thesis, nor also is his use of ‘moves,’ nor again his later use of ‘behavior,’ 
which use signals a theme of his essay.  He then introduces what he takes to be a philosophically 
important distinction between two admittedly ambiguous notions ― logical fallacy and logical 
error ― both of which he affirms involve violations: the one concerning the “norms of 
argumentative discourse,” the other, now associated with illogical moves, concerning the “norms 
of ‘logic’ governing certain human knowledge-seeking activities.”  Koszowy here asks about the 
relationship between the two notions and then introduces another issue, one he believes vital to 
argumentation theorists: “what kind of general logical concepts are involved in describing 
illogical moves?”  He links this question to Toulmin’s concern about ‘failures of rationality’ and, 
indeed, about the very ‘criteria of rationality.’  In this connection, Koszowy reaches to relate his 
discussion to “the genesis of illogical thinking” and “the problem of describing and explaining 
non-logical moves” (emphases added).  By making these moves he seems accordingly to have 
set himself the project of providing “criteria of human rational behavior”; and this is just what he 
is really after, notwithstanding the title of his essay.  Koszowy closes his introduction by 
presenting his thesis that the concept of logical error ― being more general than that of logical 
fallacy and thereby well qualified as a philosophically meritorious concept ― is more 
pragmatically efficacious in capturing what is involved in the human behavior of making 
illogical moves.  Again, his use of ‘behavior’ signals his orientation to a theory of logic.  At the 
end of his essay Koszowy reaffirms this position by noting that his intention is not to replace the 
concept of logical fallacy with that of logical error, but only to introduce another theoretical 
concept that can better assess the “logical incorrectness of human thought,” and again we 
encounter his affinity with Toulmin’s notion of rationality. 
From here Koszowy aims to steer his reader through a maze of philosophical concepts, 
generally using the terminology of argumentation theorists.  A resonant, underlying theme 
becomes readily apparent: Koszowy, as many informal logicians cum argumentation and speech-
act theorists, stresses the human activity of reasoning ― he is interested to assess cognitive 
correctness and cognitive error.  Indeed, Koszowy focuses on human behavior ― namely, on 
the matter of “the criteria of human rational behavior.”  Logic, then, which notion he recognizes 
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to have as many meanings as logicians, has only a secondary concern with logical consequence 
(sc., with validity) and really a principal concern with psychology or with norms regulating 
human interaction (sc., with pragmatics).  Koszowy does not seem to exclude dialogue with 
oneself.  In any case, we are not exaggerating Koszowy’s representation of logic: he cites Ewa 
Żarnecka-Biały, who holds that there are “infinitely many systems in logic, based on different 
tricks of syntax or semantics and in fact no one knows what relation these systems have to our 
natural logical skills” (emphasis added).  Koszowy takes logic “broadly as some system of rules 
of rationality” (emphasis added). 
Koszowy then distinguishes a logical fallacy from a logical error in the following way: a 
logical fallacy falls within the extension of logical error.  Thus, while every logical fallacy is an 
instance of a logical error, not every logical error is an instance of a logical fallacy.  Koszowy 
wants to argue that the concept of logical fallacy, as it has been traditionally used by logicians 
and more recently by argumentation theorists, is too narrow or restrictive to compass and to 
provide a good philosophical account of human error, or even correctness of reasoning.  A 
logical fallacy, then, is either (1) formal, as in the case when a given proposition is not a logical 
consequence of a given set of propositions ― this bears on validity, or (2) an error within the 
dynamics of argumentative discourse.  Perhaps Koszowy means to consider the second kind of 
fallacy informal.  Again, he links such fallacies to the ‘fixation of beliefs.’  Koszowy indicates 
that he takes considerations of logical fallacy to entail an epistemic, or intentional, approach to 
treating mistakes in reasoning, or, that is, mistakes in knowledge-seeking activities. 
When Koszowy turns to consider logical error, he cites its two intensions: (1) the one seems 
to reproduce the notion of a formal violation of deductive inference; (2) the second to include 
any, and every, illogical move, which move he defines as an “error in the domain of thinking” … 
and thinking, we learn, is not an exclusive club of select domains.  At this juncture Koszowy 
informs the reader of his notion of logic, or the logical: logic is “the tool of cognition” and 
appropriately applied to any and every knowledge-seeking activity.  Thus: “every violation of the 
rules governing knowledge-seeking activities constitutes the ‘illogical’ behavior.”  And, as a 
consequence of this posture, Koszowy takes illogical cognitive actions not to be reducible to 
those argumentative mistakes usually considered to be fallacies.  A logical error, or an illogical 
cognitive behavior, threatens belief-fixation; and, after all, knowledge is a mental experience.  
And so: 
 
cases of inadequate thinking can be named in various ways  …  for example, [as] ‘thought-
stoppers’, ‘logically-odd assertions’, ‘self-refuting slogans’, cases of ‘shoddy thinking’, 
‘logically-interesting bad thinking’, ‘thought-impeding errors’ or even ‘logical viruses’  
(emphasis added). 
 
Koszowy considers these and other similar expressions to describe violations of thinking 
procedures or violations in knowledge-seeking activities, and he does not especially restrict the 
extension of knowledge-seeking activities.  And whatever his more exact meanings of 
‘inadequate thinking’ or  ‘illogical move’ or ‘irrational’ are, they are surely not restricted to 
formal fallacies, such as, for example, denying the antecedent, or informal fallacies, such as, for 
example, argumentum ad hominem. 
Next, Koszowy defends his thesis about the merit of distinguishing the notions of logical 
fallacy and logical error.  He accords preference to the notion of logical error by providing, first, 
two arguments rejecting the distinction and then, second, rejoining each with his 
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counterargument.  (1) The traditional approach to assessing fallacies as cognitive errors best 
provides for their analysis within the domain, or field, of argumentative discourse.  (2) Fallacy 
theory naturally, or traditionally, falls within argumentation theory, which, then, is best, formally 
and theoretically, able to critique human unreasonableness.  As a consequence, then, the notion 
of logical error is useless, redundant, and unnecessary.  Koszowy responds to each argument.  (1) 
The Aristotelian categorization of fallacies is too narrow ― “many problems concerning errors 
were insufficiently considered; thus, his concept [of fallacy] does not cover the whole 
‘environment of error.’”  The force, Koszowy believes, lying behind his counterargument holds 
that “there are many factors constituting the common situation of the language use such as the 
genesis of error, which cannot be grasped by argumentation theory” (emphasis added).  It is 
difficult to understand how Koszowy here relates ‘language use’ and ‘genesis of error.’  (2) The 
concept of fallacy, taken historically, involves “the goal of (scientific) cognition” and implicates 
scientific method.  On this count, then, a fallacy involves some error of, or fault in, applying a 
method.  Taking this position, according to Koszowy, immediately involves “(scientific) 
language … logic … rationality … reasonableness … rules (of logic, of rationality or of the 
discourse).”  At this juncture Koszowy seems to toss the whole matter into the air when he 
affirms that we have, perhaps, an unassailable problem, namely, defining logical error; and he 
links this to the problem of choosing among the countless concepts of logic itself.  Surely, then, 
traditional logic ― or, traditional rationality ― is useless on this count.  This is a familiar theme 
among the various contemporary trends challenging the crown of formal logic. 
The upshot of Koszowy’s second counterargument ― recognizing as its does (1) the putative 
narrowness of the notion of “the criteria of the correctness (reasonableness) of an argument” and 
(2) that the notion of “illogical incorrectness (the concept of ‘illogical move’)” compasses more 
than argumentational moves, or behaviors ― the upshot is to “demand [nothing less] than 
establishing Toulmin’s ‘criteria of rationality.’”  In short, then, the extension of the notion of 
logical error embraces non-argumentational human errors in the broad domain, or the many 
domains, of knowledge-seeking processes.  And, since Toulmin’s notion of rationality ― not 
restricted to the formal strictures of mathematical logic nor even to the formalism of 
argumentation theory that considers, for example, rules governing disputational discourse (by 
which are explained the traditional and non-traditional fallacies) ― and so, since Toulmin’s 
notion of rationality compasses almost any ‘reasonable’ behavior, Koszowy believes that the 
notion of logical error is unbounded in respect of what activity aims at fixing a belief.  Perhaps 
threatening someone with a clenched fist is a logical move in one context, an illogical move in 
another context.  How narrowly, on Koszowy’s count, traditional logic is circumscribed.  People 
might make mistakes when they think about things.  Koszowy wants to consider each such 
mistake to be an instance of an illogical move.  He seems to make no finer distinctions, and, of 
course, traditional logic is obviated. 
Toward the end of his defense in behalf of employing the notion of logical error toward 
evaluating human reasonableness, Koszowy cites its philosophical generality, pointing out that 
such generality somehow entails its usefulness. 
 
This is the argument for the usefulness of general-philosophical concepts for the study of 
argumentation. The concept of logical error is one of such concepts. Thus, I claim that the 
concept of logical error fulfills (and after all is able to fulfill) the task of a kind of the 
general-philosophical concept which the concept of fallacy does not (in all the cases). 
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He ends this passage with an affirmation that “this is [just] the pragmatic need of distinguishing 
the concept of logical error from that of fallacy.”  ‘Pragmatic’ here seems ambiguous.  (1) Does 
it mean practical?  Or (2) does Koszowy place himself in a certain tradition of logic? 
Finally, Koszowy turns to consider some of the, perhaps, significant implications of his 
thesis.  And here he allows himself some room to speculate.  He wants his approach to compass 
not only the traditional matters of language and argumentation, but also those of cognition and 
thinking ― that is, to embrace within the arena of logic such matters as relate to the domains of 
sociology, psychology, and linguistics, etc.  Thus, a consideration of unreasonableness 
immediately implicates a consideration of reasonableness, both of which, again, are better treated 
by the notion of logical error and, thus, also of logical correctness.  In his concluding remarks 
perhaps we find Koszowy’s real, underlying agenda when he writes that a “logical error in [its] 
wide sense can be … understood as a cognitive error ― error in the domain of cognizing”: 
 
Then, for example, Mach’s approach (1976) could count as psychological analyses of logical 
errors [Koszowy’s emphasis].  If we understand fallacies epistemologically as mistakes in 
processes of gaining knowledge, it seems we need to consider the psychological background 
(genesis) of those mistakes … (emphasis added). 
 
By invoking Mach does Koszowy mean to endorse a neo-Kantian psychology?  Koszowy then 
happily cites Hofstadter & Moser (1989: 185) to forge the link between the study of linguistic 
errors and psychological research in cognition having to do with, we take it, knowledge-seeking 
activity. 
 
In fact, the study of errors is a royal road to understanding how concepts are unconsciously 
organized and activated.  Psychologists have known for a long time that slips of the tongue 
can provide enlightening glimpses into the mechanisms of cognition.  By studying such 
errors, one can learn much about the mind without doing any formal psychological 
experiments  (emphasis added). 
 
From here it is an easy step, Koszowy maintains, once considering a logical error to be “a case or 
a result of ‘illogical thinking,’” to consider a logical error also “as irrational thinking, and in 
particular as ‘irrational belief’ or even irrational actions.”  Once this connection is established, 
there is license to consider even an immoral action as a logical error, as an ‘irrational (illogical) 
action.’  And Koszowy does not stop there with the possible applications of the concept of 
logical error.  He writes, in a quizzically assertive manner: “can inductive inferences in 
experimental science he called ‘logical errors’?,” since “inductive reasoning is not certain.”  
Again: “can the statistical inferences in science … be treated as logical errors just for the obvious 
reason that human reasoning based on sensually experienced data is ‘naturally’ non-conclusive?”  
‘Non-conclusive’?  With this statement, Koszowy seems to double back on his entire position, 
which position, while not fully in accord with argumentation theory, informal logic, critical 
thinking, etc., is nevertheless sufficiently ensconced in those traditions to challenge the 
‘hegemony’ of formal logic.  With his continual emphasis on cognitive behavior, or mental 
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2.  Three matters of concern   
 
Our survey of Koszowy’s essay aims to highlight some of the salient points of his treatment 
of a topic of continuing interest to argumentation theorists and informal logicians.  At the essay’s 
end he expressed a hope that he had “drawn the initial map” for the task of examining further the 
“sound philosophical concept” of logical error that might “[fulfill] some important 
philosophical tasks.”  We believe that he has been modestly successful in this endeavor.  Now, 
while Koszowy’s treatment of this topic addresses a number of important concerns and provokes 
our intellectual imagination in a wide range of other concerns suggested by his essay, we shall 
restrict our comments to three matters only: the first addresses a matter of style; the second 
endorses Koszowy’s focus on knowledge-seeking; the third, itself having two aspects, cautions 
Koszowy about a direction his research might take that would frustrate his philosophical 
objective. 
 
2.1. A stylist matter 
 
Koszowy has treated his topic in a manner that he acknowledges to be more preparatory to 
further study than conclusive in nature.  This, of course, is surely an acceptable project.  Still, he 
whets our appetite, and we wish that he could have satisfied our intellectual curiosity more 
substantively while not eclipsing his desire to set the course for continued study.  Koszowy 
might have taken a significantly different tact, one providing his reader with something perhaps 
more daring if not challenging.  In particular, right at the outset he might more determinately 
have drawn the distinction between the concepts of logical fallacy and logical error by making 
the distinction patently clear as he understands the two concepts ― in other words, he could have 
taken authority for their use without defending their distinction.  He could then have proceeded 
by demonstrating the efficacy of their application to evaluating some knowledge-seeking 
activities.  A reader gets little taste of this matter.  This alternative approach would obviate 
having especially to defend the distinction in such a detached and hesitant a manner.  Taking this 
tact would have enhanced the coherence, the force, and the focus of his discussion and better 
assisted in accomplishing his objective … and it would have engaged the reader more actively.  
Moreover, Koszowy seems not to have circumscribed the topic with sufficient care.  As it now 
stands the essay seems on the surface to aim to establish a distinction between two concepts 
relating to argumentation theory and informal logic, when it rather more aims to redefine, or 
amplify already existing definitions of, human rationality.  In this connection, Koszowy’s choice 
of title seems to misrepresent his real intention, which is only subordinately to promote a 
theoretical distinction.  The treatment of his topic could have been significantly more direct.  
Finally, the essay trails off into speculating about ‘uncharted territory,’ but it provides little 
indication of signposts necessary for finding our way, save for some references to Toulmin.  
Koszowy has taken too tentative a posture toward a topic that he might have treated more boldly.  
Still, this comment is less important in respect of substantive matters relating to Koszowy’s topic 
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2.2. The knowledge-seeking objective   
 
Koszowy frames his discussion within a context of human beings seeking knowledge.  This 
is really a core concern of Koszowy’s essay, and one that we believe he has not sufficiently 
brought to the fore.  Short of what we take to be his under-emphasis, we commend Koszowy for 
promoting this concern and encourage his continuing in this direction.  In this respect, then, 
perhaps he seems to diverge somewhat from the objectives announced by pragma-dialecticians, 
argumentation theorists, and even informal logicians who all have subordinated or diminished 
this objective when they promote the context/participant relativity of good and bad 
argumentation, of cogency and fallaciousness, indeed, even when they raise questions about 
what an argument or an argumentation is.  There are hints in Koszowy’s discussion that he varies 
from argumentation theorists, but these hints are neither articulated directly nor incisively.  Thus, 
in connection with acknowledging the importance of establishing knowledge, this under-
emphasis is a disappointing aspect of his discussion.  Especially problematic in this connection is 
Koszowy’s nowhere using the word ‘objective’ to characterize the kind of knowledge human 
beings might earnestly seek.  Koszowy is not expected to have extensively treated the various 
notions of knowledge, but he might have framed his treatment of error within, for example, a 
correspondence or a coherentist notion of truth and falsity.  Having done this would have 
provided a baseline against which to assess ‘logical errors’ in the pursuit of knowledge as we 
understand this process. 
However, on second thought, it might not have been accidental that Koszowy omitted 
treating the matter of objective knowledge, even incidentally.  For, if he had subscribed to a 
notion of objective knowledge, it would have placed restrictions on his notion of human 
rationality, on his notion of the criteria of human rational behavior, and, more important, on 
his notion of logic.  Traditionally, logic, or the science of logic, has compassed a study of 
underlying logics (each consisting in a grammar, a deduction system, and a semantics) ― that is, 
in brief, a study of the underlying structures of intelligible discourse.  In addition, traditionally, 
then, the science of logic has fallen under the domain of epistemology, even if important 
ontological matters are involved.  Thus, employing a deductive logic has been understood as 
employing an instrument (one among others) whose end is to establish objective knowledge.  
And this end can be realized in two senses: (1) establishing knowledge (as corollary with 
induction) of the truth or falsity of a given proposition; and (2) establishing knowledge that a 
given proposition follows logically from other given propositions.  Underlying intelligible 
discourse ― might we say, human rationality? ― at least since Aristotle’s formulations, are the 
ontic principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle.  And these principles implicate the 
necessity of considering semantic and deductive matters.  While it is undeniable that natural 
language is very rich, or very messy as the case may be, and that thus far no formal, or artificial, 
language has ably modeled this richness of natural language, this failing (if it be so called) of 
formal logic does not obviate a need for precision of expression for the purposes of 
understanding, whether relating to scientific discourse, or negotiating a labor contract, or just 
getting some matter clear in one’s own mind.  In this respect, then, formal logicians have never 
considered themselves completely to capture rationality; rather, they have aimed to provide 
standards, such as, for example, notions of logical consequence and of a logically prefect 
language, by which human beings in their everyday lives can evaluate their progress toward 
objective knowledge.  However, having logic embrace the pragmatics of discourse and personal 
psychology distracts this accomplishment. 
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Thus, on the one hand, Koszowy seems to promote the noble end of pursuing truth when he 
couches his discussion in a framework of knowledge-seeking, while, on the other hand, by 
broadening the notion of rationality he seems to subvert his purpose and subjectivize knowledge. 
 
2.3.1. On the extension of rationality   
 
Koszowy is surely a traditionalist philosopher, for he takes a very classical, essentialist 
posture toward the study of human being, and thus of all human activities.  Underlying his 
treatment of logic, which, recall, he defines as “the tool of cognition” and “broadly as some 
system of rules of rationality,” is his subscribing to the traditional Western proposition, 
expressed at least by Aristotle and St. Thomas, that ‘Man is a rational animal’ ― and in the train 
of this proposition are all the associations of logos and logic and speech and language and reason 
and intelligence, etc.  It is an easy step here from taking the human essence, in connection with 
Koszowy’s topic, to considering the examination of all human behavior to fall under two classes, 
namely: rational behavior and non-rational behavior.  And let us say, which seems 
commensurate with Koszowy’s thinking, that all human beings aim at the Good, or, at least, are 
motivated by their conception of the Good, the Good or Truth, and, thus, they all aim at 
knowledge or what they take to be knowledge as such serves their purposes.  And, since a given 
human being is not perfect in his/her understanding, a human being is liable to error ― to display 
certain kinds of ‘erroneous behavior’ ― in any number of knowledge-seeking domains. 
Thus, working from an essentialist notion of human being, Koszowy maintains that when a 
human being acts reasonably, rationally, logically, sanely, etc., he/she is just expressing his/her 
proper nature qua human.  This is acting ― to wit, behaving and cognizing ― properly or 
correctly in connection with matters human.  This is just a good person.  And when a human 
being acts unreasonably, illogically, or improperly, he/she is expressing something contrary to 
his/her nature qua human being.  This is acting ― to wit, behaving and cognizing ― improperly, 
incorrectly, or erroneously in one or another context or situation.  This is just a bad person, or, 
perhaps better, a ‘good’ person making a bad move. 
Now, since (1) every human being in esse is a rational being, and since (2) every human 
move/behavior is an expression of human being (of being human), and (3) among human 
behavioral expressions are knowledge-seeking activities (a proper subset of human behaviors), 
thus, (4) every human knowledge-seeking behavior is a rational/logical behavior.  This syllogism 
is simple enough.  Yet, this does not sound quite correct, because: either (i) we recognize some 
human moves really to be illogical moves; or (ii) we are forced to admit that every knowledge-
seeking behavior is a rational behavior and thus there exist no illogical moves.  Neither i nor ii 
would seem satisfactory to Koszowy.  Perhaps, (4) should read ‘every human knowledge-seeing 
behavior is subject to evaluation as either rational/logical or irrational/illogical.  Again, this does 
not sound quite correct from an essentialist posture with a widely compassing array of 
knowledge-seeking behaviors beyond those captured by either formal logic or argumentation 
theory. 
Perhaps Koszowy subscribes to some notion that ‘to err is human’ and, corollary with this, to 
the notion that ‘not to err is divine.’  This being so, we might then modify the above 
argumentation as follows (picking up on suggestions of Koszowy’s classical essentialist 
orientation).  Since (1) every human being is a rational being in respect of the divine component 
in him/her, and (2) this rational capacity is not in-itself liable to error, and since (3) every human 
being has an animal, or ‘human,’ component, say desire, or attraction to pleasure and repulsion 
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from pain, and (4) error originates in the distractions of such ‘sensation,’ thus, (5) every human 
knowledge-seeking activity is a composite of reason and desire.  Now we seem to be getting 
somewhere ― the logical, to wit, the rational, is the divine element in knowledge-seeking 
activity; the illogical, to wit, the irrational, is the ‘human’ element in knowledge-seeking activity.  
At least, this in itself might not be problematic; for surely, the divine is the ideal of pure reason, 
to borrow Kant’s expression, and this notion accords well with traditional philosophy.  So what 
is illogical behavior?  Well, just acting human.  On this count, then, traditional formal logic is 
divine because ideal.  However, Koszowy’s logic is natural because messy.  And since Koszowy, 
among others, wants to get at this messy natural cognition of real human beings, he turns to the 
subjective psychology of cognition and abandons the utility of formal logic toward evaluating 
human ‘cognitive moves.’ 
Koszowy has considered human faulty behavior to fall under the rubric of logical error, and, 
by considering a logic error to be an illogical move, he has extended the notion of logical error to 
compass any cognitive mistake.  Might this include forgetting, as in ‘forgetting to bring one’s 
shovel to an archaeological dig?’  Or disappointment, as in ‘being disappointed about not having 
enough money to attend university?’  The behavior in both cases might frustrate knowledge-
seeking.  Be that as it may.  Still, his including such cognitive states seems to end in embracing 
everything, and thus nothing at the same time, under logic.  Once Koszowy has broadened the 
domain of logic, or the logical, to embrace virtually any human behavior, and making this move 
without at the same time circumscribing a notion of objective knowledge but leaving this open in 
a pragmatic way, he renders the notion of the logical, or the rational, devoid of objective 
significance.  He has provided no criteria for deciding what counts as genuine knowledge, albeit 
his leanings seem pragmatic and relativistic in nature.  Perhaps Koszowy works with some 
super-attenuated pragmatic notion of truth.  Especially problematic, then, is his having left 
undetermined any ground that might mediate differences among persons in their quests for 
knowledge or even to discern truth from error in an individual’s quest.  Moreover, would 
Koszowy recognize there to exist different reasonablenesses?  In this connection, whatever 
differences he has with argumentation theory and informal logic, he is in full accord with their 
broadening the purview of logic.  Also problematic is his advocating the psychologizing of logic, 
unlike the informalists who have thus far aimed to skirt this pitfall.  Our most serious concern 
aims to caution Koszowy about a possible outcome of his research direction. 
 
2.3.2. Tending toward psychologism   
 
The upshot of Koszowy’s ‘defense’ is to suggest that those in the field of argumentation 
theory ought to adopt Toulmin’s ‘criteria of rationality’ since the established criteria of 
correctness (or reasonableness) are inadequate for an analysis of the notion of illogical 
incorrectness.  In his concluding remarks Koszowy affirms that this broadness of the concept of 
logical error qualifies it as having philosophical merit and that broadness makes the notion more 
pragmatically efficacious for evaluating human thought and behavior.  This, as mentioned 
above, is problematic enough.  However, Koszowy proceeds further to leave his reader on a 
psychologistic note by invoking Hofstadter & Moser (1989): “the study of errors is a royal road 
to understanding how concepts are unconsciously organized and activated”; and “slips of the 
tongue can provide enlightening glimpses into the mechanisms of cognition.”  There is a parting 
shot that the notion of ‘illogical action’ might be applied to assessing almost any human activity. 
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Whatever problems some modern logicians might have with formal logic ― most of which 
concerns are rooted in their dissatisfaction with formal logic’s inability to model natural 
language, to develop a fallacy theory, and even to capture “our natural logical skills” ― their 
move to relativize cogency and fallaciousness by taking a pragmatic and/or psychologistic turn 
inescapably threatens any putative end they may retain to establish objective knowledge. 
It is not an uncommon error among ‘argumentation’ theorists to confuse making an 
inference, which is a human cognitive activity having epistemic import, with an implication, 
which is not a human cognitive activity but an ontic relationship among propositions.  A human 
being infers; a proposition implies.  We need not become absorbed in discussion over whether or 
not propositions exist: let it suffice to say that human beings express themselves linguistically 
(among other means) by uttering sentences; and the sentences logicians are interested to study 
are those expressing propositions, say the meaning or meanings of a given object language 
sentence.  Now, in connection with distinguishing inference and implication, we recognize our 
needing more carefully to distinguish epistemic matters and ontic matters ― knowing from 
being, what appears to be from what is, what is known from what is not yet known, and, in 
general, what is subjective from what is objective.  Diminishing the importance of this 
distinction amounts to surrendering a concern with objective knowledge. 
Once the discourse about good and bad argumentation, or, as Koszowy picks up this theme, 
about logical and illogical moves, ventures into relativism and subjectivity, there remains no way 
to mediate difference of opinion toward the end of establishing objective knowledge.  This 
characterizes PMD, or the Postmodern Disorder.  Shying from addressing more directly the 
matter of establishing objective knowledge, a traditional purpose of logic, argumentation 
theorists and informal logicians, and now Koszowy, have been satisfied with treating the 
pragmatics of managing discourse.  This is a worthy project; in fact, such theorists continue to 
make important contributions to contemporary mediation practices.  When Koszowy squarely 
places his concern with distinguishing logical fallacy and logical error in the framework of 
knowledge-seeking, he distinguishes himself from some recent trends among those theorists.  
However, when he couches his search, and his notion of rationality, in assessing cognitive 
behavior, he subverts this intention.  Not having established their concerns with human 
understanding firmly in an underlying ontology, in an ontology underlying epistemics, is a 
serious shortcoming of traditions to which Koszowy subscribes.  Their dissatisfaction with 
formal logic is misplaced, notwithstanding the traditional scope of formal logic and its own 
omissions. 
Let us take as given (notwithstanding the usual caveats) the existence of the world existing 
independently of human consciousness, on the one hand, and, on the other, the existence of 
human beings having cognitions about the world.  Let us also say that a human being’s thoughts 
(cognitions) about the world are reflections in consciousness of matters external to 
consciousness.  (Of course, this statement does not capture all matters someone might consider.)  
In addition, let us say that these cognitions in consciousness are reflected by object language 
sentences, the kind logicians are wont to consider.  Such sentences might be taken to express 
propositions about the world.  When such a sentence expresses a proposition that itself 
corresponds to an objectively existing state of affairs, then we say the proposition is true, 
otherwise false.  Saying that a sentence is true is elliptical for affirming the proposition to be 
true, that what it denotes, or the meaning of the sentence, corresponds to a situation existing 
independently in the world.  Sometimes human beings get it right; sometimes they do not get it 
right.  Sometimes they believe they have it right when they do; other times they believe 
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themselves to have it right when they do not.  Etc., etc.  A project of epistemology is to provide 
means for distinguishing true propositions from false propositions so that a person’s knowledge 
of the world ― the collection of sentences expressing propositions in consciousness ― provides 
him/her an accurate and consistent understanding/knowledge/reflection of the world.  Formal 
logic has contributed significantly to that project. 
Now, moreover, if we understand the law of non-contradiction ― an ontic principle ― to 
obtain, then, while a given contradiction might be expressible in thought, what is denoted by the 
two contradictories is an impossible state of affairs.  It is this condition of impossibility that 
makes a contradiction unintelligible.  (Dialectical logic can be treated separately; our discussion 
circumscribes a traditional notion of contradiction.)  Given this understanding of ontic matters 
underlying truth and falsity, semantics some might say, we can further grasp the ontic 
underpinning of validity, one dimension of the relations of propositions to one another.  The 
ontic underpinning of validity makes unintelligible that true propositions imply a false 
proposition precisely because the state of affairs denoted by such propositions is impossible.  We 
thus have confidence to affirm that the principle of contradiction is one foundation of rationality 
and intelligibility, whether we work with a correspondence, a coherentist, or pragmatic 
conception of truth.  However, reducing logic, or rationality, to mental states ― to have the laws 
of logic be the laws of mental functioning ― without grounding those mental states in an 
objectively existing world, that is, without their being reflections in subjective consciousness of 
objectively existing states of affairs, is to embrace psychologism.  Taking this tact renders the 
notion of knowledge-seeking activity meaningless, unless, of course, such activity is viewed as 
any behavior that produces a desired end.  In that case, anything goes. 
If we want to understand the world, working, for example, as here with a 
correspondence/reflection epistemology, and granting that such understanding is cultivated by 
having in consciousness true propositions, then we have ready to hand in formal logic one 
instrument (among others) to assist in seeking objective knowledge. 
If we want to help persons work through differences of opinion, but not necessarily with an 
end to establish who is right, who wrong, but to come to some resolution (mediation) agreeable 
to disputing parties, then we have ready to hand argumentation theory that assists in managing 
disputation.  However, this approach suspends the end of knowledge. 
If we want to learn why someone is prone to believing that affirming the consequent 
produces a ‘good argument,’ or why someone is immoral, then we have ready to hand such 
disciplines as psychology, sociology, psycholinguistics, neurophysiology, etc., etc.  Here we 
encounter such notions as ‘what is rational to one person might not be rational to another 
person,’ etc.  Rationality becomes individualized or ‘populationized.’  This might help us along 
the royal road to acquiring “enlightening glimpses into the mechanisms of cognition,” but it does 
not provide us with objective knowledge.  This is especially problematic at a time when such 
understanding is all the more necessary. 
 
 
3. Concluding remarks   
 
Marcin Koszowy addresses a topic of traditional importance in the history of philosophy ― 
namely, the pursuit of knowledge or truth.  His essay has aimed to provide insight into errors 
persons make during their knowledge-seeking activities by defending the thesis that logical 
fallacy is too narrow a notion, restricted in application by both formal logicians and 
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argumentation theorists.  Rather, he has argued that logical error, that is, mistakes in cognition, 
is a better notion for evaluating human error in pursuit of knowledge.  However, when (1) he 
affirms that logic is an instrument used in knowledge-seeking activities and then (2) concerns 
himself with patterns of cognitions without reference to objective conditions against which to 
assess those cognitions, he frustrates his purpose.  His broad philosophical notion of logical 
error, just because of its compassing cognition, then, cannot fulfill some important philosophical 
tasks, whatever they might be.  In short, Marcin Koszowy’s prescribing psychologism will 
undermine his philosophical objective. 
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